The European Court of Auditors' new special report on large, cross-border transport projects paints a picture of European infrastructure that is far from delivering at the pace and cost that many of the projects were sold on. The auditors have reviewed eight so-called megaprojects, which are central components of the EU's trans-European transport network (TEN-T), and the main conclusion is that delays and cost overruns have become a consistent pattern. The projects are significantly behind their original plans, and therefore the auditors assess that the goal of having the core trans-European transport network in place by 2030 is no longer realistic.
The eight megaprojects
Rail Baltica
Extensive railway project connecting the Baltic states with Poland and the rest of the European railway network.
-
Lyon-Turin
Railway connection between France and Italy with the Mont-d’Ambin base tunnel as the central element.
-
Brenner Base Tunnel
Railway tunnel through the Alps between Innsbruck in Austria and Franzensfeste in Italy.
-
Fehmarn Belt Fixed Link
Fixed road and rail link between Denmark and Germany.
-
Basque Y
Railway project in the Basque Country to connect Bilbao, Vitoria, and Donostia-San Sebastián and strengthen connections to France and Madrid.
-
Seine-Scheldt
Major waterway project upgrading and connecting inland waterways between France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.
-
Romanian Motorway Project (A1)
Motorway corridor across Romania between Bucharest and the Hungarian border.
-
E59
Railway corridor from the Czech Republic through Poland to the Baltic Sea.
The special report is fundamentally about two things: time and money. On the time side, the auditors point out that several projects have been pushed so far that the overall European network effect either fails to materialise or materialises much later than anticipated. It is not just a matter of individual construction projects being delayed, but of the coherence of entire corridors being disrupted. When key bottlenecks are not removed as planned, it becomes more difficult to realise the benefits that have been used as political justification: faster freight flows, shorter travel times, increased rail capacity, and more robust logistics across national borders.
Time is expensive
On the financial side, the report shows that the total estimated costs for the eight projects have increased significantly. This underscores the economic risks that arise when schedules slip. The auditors also highlight that the EU is directly financially involved and that in recent years additional EU funds have been allocated to these projects. This point is central because EU support is often highlighted as a mark of quality. The conclusion of the Court of Auditors is that financing in itself does not solve the structural problems if planning, management, and implementation cannot keep up with the ambitions.
Among the group of eight projects, the Fehmarn Belt connection is included as one of the major cross-border constructions that the EU considers crucial for the cohesion of the European transport corridors. The auditors place the connection on the Scandinavian-Mediterranean corridor and describe it as a central element in the transport axis between Northern and Southern Europe. Thus, the connection is not only assessed as a Danish-German construction project but as a European link that should make the entire corridor function better.
Fehmarn is best case
At the same time, it is worth noting how the Fehmarn Belt connection is included in the report's comparative perspective. In a review where several of the other projects are pushed far into the future, Fehmarn appears as the most robust case in the field. This is not because the project is without challenges, but because it is relatively assessed to be further ahead than the other megaprojects.
The auditors' assessment of the Femern project is, however, also characterised by being general. The report does not delve into the technical implementation or the specific construction phases, but is based on a comparison of schedules and financial frameworks across the projects. This means that the assessment should primarily be read as a relative position in the EU's overall portfolio and not as a detailed evaluation of the practical progress.
